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Abstract The state of the art performance of deep learning
models comes at a high cost for companies and institutions,
due to the tedious data collection and the heavy processing
requirements. Recently, [35,22] proposed to watermark con-
volutional neural networks for image classification, by em-
bedding information into their weights. While this is a clear
progress towards model protection, this technique solely al-
lows for extracting the watermark from a network that one
accesses locally and entirely.
Instead, we aim at allowing the extraction of the water-
mark from a neural network (or any other machine learning
model) that is operated remotely, and available through a
service API. To this end, we propose to mark the model’s
action itself, tweaking slightly its decision frontiers so that
a set of specific queries convey the desired information. In
the present paper, we formally introduce the problem and
propose a novel zero-bit watermarking algorithm that makes
use of adversarial model examples. While limiting the loss
of performance of the protected model, this algorithm al-
lows subsequent extraction of the watermark using only few
queries. We experimented the approach on three neural net-
works designed for image classification, in the context of
MNIST digit recognition task.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a fierce competition for the de-
sign and training of top notch deep neural networks. The
industrial advantage from the possession of a state of the
art model is now widely acknowledged, starting to motivate
some attacks for stealing those models [33,9]. Since it is
now clear that machine learning models will play a central
role in the IT development in the years to come, the neces-
sity for protecting those models appears more salient.
In 1994, [36] proposed to covertly embed a marker into
digital content (such as audio or video data) in order to iden-
tify its ownership: by revealing the presence of such marker
a copyright owner could prove its rights over the content.
The authors coined the term digital watermarking. The fact
that neural networks are digital content naturally questions
the transferability of such techniques to those models.
[35,22] published the first method for watermarking a
neural network that might be publicly shared and thus for
which traceability through ownership extraction is impor-
tant. The marked object is here a neural network and its
trained parameters. However, this method requires the abil-
ity to directly access the model weights: the model is con-
sidered as a white box. The watermark embedding is per-
formed through the use of a regularizer at training time. This
regularization introduces the desired statistical bias into the
parameters, which will serve as the watermark. We are inter-
ested in a related though different problem, namely zero-bit
watermarking of neural networks (or any machine learning
models) that are only remotely accessible through an API.
The extraction of a zero-bit watermark in a given model
refers to detecting the presence or the absence of the mark in
that model. This type of watermark, along with the required
key to extract it, is sufficient for an entity that suspects a non
legitimate usage of the marked model to confirm it or not.
In stark contrast to [35,22]’s approach, we seek a black
box watermarking approach that allows extraction to be con-
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ducted remotely, without access to the model itself. More
precisely, the extraction test of the proposed watermark con-
sists in a set of requests to the machine learning service,
available through an API [33]. This allows the detection of
(leaked) models when model’s parameters are directly ac-
cessible, but also when the model is only exposed through
an online service. Second, we target the watermarking of
models in general, i.e., our scheme is not restricted solely to
neural networks, whether of a certain type or not.
Rationale. We thus aim at embedding zero-bit watermarks
into models, that can be extracted remotely. In this setup,
we can only rely on interactions with the model through the
remote API, e.g., on object recognition queries in case of
an image classification model. The input, e.g., images, must
thus convey a means to embed identification information
into the model (zero-bit watermarking step) and to extract,
or not, the identification information from the remote model
(watermark extraction step), see Fig. 1. Our algorithm’s ra-
tionale is that the embedded watermark is a slight modifica-
tion of the original model’s decision frontiers around a set
of specific inputs that form the hidden key. Answers of the
remote model to these inputs are compared to those of the
marked model. A strong match (despite the possible manip-
ulation of the leaked model) must indicate the presence of
the watermark in the remote model with a high probability.
The inputs in the key must be crafted in a way that wa-
termarking the model of interest does not degrade signifi-
cantly its performance. To this end, we leverage adversarial
perturbations of training examples [11] that produce new ex-
amples (the “adversaries”) very close the model’s decision
frontiers. As such adversaries tend to generalize across mod-
els, notably across different neural network architectures for
visual recognition, see e.g., [29], this frontier tweaking should
resist model manipulation and yield only few false positives
(wrong identification of non marked models).
Contributions. The contributions of this article are: 1) A
formalization of the problem of zero-bit watermarking a model
for remote identification, and associated requirements (Sec-
tion 2); 2) A practical algorithm, the frontier stitching al-
gorithm based on adversaries that “clamp” the model fron-
tiers, to address this problem. We also introduce a statistical
framework for reasoning about the uncertainty regarding the
remote model; we leverage a null hypothesis, for measuring
the success of the watermark extraction (Section 3); 3) Ex-
periments with three different types of neural networks on
the MNIST dataset, validating the approach with regards to
the specified requirements (Section 4).
2 Watermarking for Remote Extraction
Considered scenario. The scenario that motivates our work
is as follows: An entity, having designed and trained a ma-
chine learning model, notably a neural network, wants to
zero-bit watermark it (top-action on Fig. 1). This model could
then be placed in production for applications and services.
In case of the suspicion of a security breach in that applica-
tion (model has leaked by being copied at a bit-level), the
entity suspecting a given online service to re-use that leaked
model can query that remote service for answering its doubts
(bottom-action).
Like for classic media watermarking methods ([14,36]),
our approach includes operations of embedding (the entity
inserts the zero-bit watermark in its model), and extraction
(the entity verifies the presence or not of its watermark in the
suspected model), and a study of possible attacks (actions
performed by others in order to remove the watermark from
the model).
Modeling Requirements. Following works in the multime-
dia domain [14], and by [35,22], we adapt the requirements
for a watermarking method to the specific capability of re-
mote watermark extraction (black box set-up). We choose
those requirements to structure the remaining of this article.
We consider the problem of zero-bit watermarking a generic
classifier, for remote watermark extraction. Let d be the di-
mension of the input space (raw signal space for neural nets
or hand-crafted feature space for linear and non-linear SVMs),
and C the finite set of target labels. Let k : Rd → C be the
perfect classifier for the problem (i.e., k(x) is always the
correct answer). Let kˆ : Rd → C be the trained classifier to
be watermarked, and F be the space of possible such classi-
fiers. Our aim is to find a zero-bit watermarked version of kˆ
(hereafter denoted kˆw) along with a set K ⊂ Rd of specific
inputs, named the key, and their labels {kˆw(x), x ∈ K}.
The purpose is to query with the key a remote model that
can be either kˆw or another unmarked model kr ∈ F . The
key, which is thus composed of “objects” to be classified, is
used to embed the watermark into kˆ.
Here are listed the requirements of an ideal watermarked
model and key couple, (kˆw,K):
Loyal. The watermark embedding does not hinder the per-
formance of the original classifier:
∀x ∈ Rd, /∈ K, kˆ(x) = kˆw(x). (1)
Efficient. The key is as short as possible, as accessing the
watermark requires |K| requests.
Effective. The embedding allows unique identification of
kˆw using K (zero-bit watermarking):
∀kr ∈ F, kr 6= kˆw ⇒ ∃x ∈ K s.t. kr(x) 6= kˆw(x). (2)
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Fig. 1 Our goal: zero-bit watermarking a model locally (top-action), for remote assessment of a potential model leak (bottom-action).
Robust. Attacks (such as fine-tuning or compression) to kˆw
do not remove the watermark1:
∀x ∈ K, (kˆw + ε)(x) = kˆw(x). (3)
Secure. No efficient algorithm exists to detect the presence
of the watermark in a model by an unauthorized party.
Note that effectiveness is a new requirement as compared
to the list of Uchida et al. Also, their capacity requirement,
i.e., the amount of information that can be embedded by a
method, is not part of ours as our goal is to decide whether
watermarked model is used or not (zero-bit watermark ex-
traction).
One can observe the conflicting nature of effectiveness
and robustness: If, for instance, (kˆw+ε) ∈ F then this func-
tion violates one of the two. In order to allow for a practical
setup for the problem, we rely on a measuremK(a, b) of the
matching between two classifiers a, b ∈ F :
mK(a, b) =
∑
x∈K
δ(a(x), b(x)), (4)
where δ is the Kronecker delta. One can observe thatmK(a, b)
is simply the Hamming distance between the vectors a(K)
and b(K), thus based on elements in K. With this focus on
distance, our two requirements can now be recast in a non-
conflicting way:
– Robustness: ∀ε ≈ 0,mK(kˆw, kˆw + ε) ≈ 0
– Effectiveness: ∀kr ∈ F,mK(kˆw, kr) ≈ |K|
3 The Frontier Stitching Algorithm
We now present a practical zero-bit model watermarking al-
gorithm that permits remote extraction through requests to
an API, following the previously introduced requirements.
Our aim is to output a watermarked model kˆw, which can
1 “kˆw + ε” stands for a small modification of the parameters of kˆw
that preserves the value of the model, i.e., that does not deteriorate
significantly its performance.
for instance be placed into production for use by consumers,
together with a watermark keyK to be used in case of model
leak suspicion. For the security requirement to hold, we ob-
viously discard any form of visible watermark insertion [4].
Fig. 2 illustrates the approach in the setting of a binary clas-
sifier (without loss of generality).
As we use input points for watermarking the owned model
and subsequently to query a suspected remote model, the
choice of those inputs is crucial. A non watermarking-based
solution based simply on choosing arbitrarily |K| training
examples (along with their correct labels), is very unlikely
to succeed in the identification of a specific valuable model:
Classifying those points correctly should be easy for highly
accurate classifiers, which will then provide similar results,
ruining the effectiveness. On the other hand, the opposite
strategy of selecting |K| arbitrary examples and fine-tuning
kˆ so that it changes the way they are classified (e.g., ∀x ∈
K, kˆ(x) 6= kˆw(x)) is an option to modify the model’s be-
havior in an identifiable way. However, fine-tuning on even
few examples that are possibly far from decision frontiers
will significantly alter the performance of kˆ: The produced
solution will not be loyal.
Together, those observations lead to the conclusion that
the selected points should be close to the original model’s
decision frontier, that is, their classification is not trivial and
depends heavily on the model (Fig. 2(a)). Finding and ma-
nipulating such inputs is the purpose of adversarial pertur-
bations [11,21]. Given a trained model, any well classified
example can be modified in a very slight way such that it
is now misclassified. Such modified samples are called “ad-
versarial examples”, or adversaries in short.
The proposed frontier stitching algorithm, presented in
Algorithm 1, makes use of such adversaries, selected to “clamp”
the frontier in a unique, yet harmless way (Fig. 2(a)). It pro-
ceeds in two steps to mark the model. The first step is to
select a small key set K of specific input points, which is
composed of two types of adversaries. It first contains clas-
sic adversaries, we call true adversaries, that are misclassi-
fied by kˆ although being each very close to a well classified
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Fig. 2 Illustration of proposed approach for a binary classifier. (a) The proposed algorithm first computes “true adversaries” (R and B) and “false”
ones (R¯ and B¯) for both classes from training examples. They all lie close the decision frontier. (b) It then fine-tunes the classifier such that these
inputs are now all well classified, i.e., the 8 true adversaries are now correctly classified in this example while the 4 false ones remain so. This
results in a loyal watermarked model (very similar to original one) and a key size of |K| = 12 here. This process resembles “stitching” around
data points.
example. It also contains false adversaries, each obtained
by applying an adversarial perturbation to a well classified
example without ruining its classification. In practice, the
“fast gradient sign method” proposed in [11] is used with a
suitable gradient step to create potential adversaries of both
types from training examples, these adversaries are inputs
that will be closer to a decision frontier than their base in-
puts. This modification in the direction of other classes is the
purpose of adversarial attacks. (Other methods include for
instance the “Jacobian-based saliency map approach” [27]).
These frontier clamping inputs are then used to mark the
model (Fig. 2(b)). The model kˆ is fine-tuned into kˆw such
that all points in K are now well classified:
∀x ∈ K, kˆw(x) = k(x). (5)
In other words, the true adversaries of kˆ in K become false
adversaries of the marked model, and false adversaries re-
main as such. The role of the false adversaries is to limit
strongly the amount of changes that the decision frontiers
will undergo when getting true adversaries back to the right
classes. False adversaries also have the role of characterizing
the shapes of the model frontiers, for adding robustness to
the statistical watermark extraction process we now present.
Statistical watermark extraction. The marking step is thus
the embedding of such a crafted key in the original model,
while the watermark extraction consists in asking the remote
model to classify the inputs in key K, to assess the presence
or not of the zero-bit watermark (Algorithm 2). We now an-
alyze statistically this extraction problem.
As discussed in Section 2, the key quantity at extrac-
tion time is the Hamming distance mK (Eq. 4) between re-
mote model’s answers to the key and expected answers. The
stitching algorithm produces deterministic results with re-
spect to the imprinting of the key: A marked model perfectly
matches the key, i.e., the distancemk between kˆw and query
results in Algorithm 2(K,Klabels) equals zero. However, as
the leaked model may undergo arbitrary attacks (e.g., for
watermark removal), transforming kˆw into a model kˆ′w, one
should expect some deviation in kˆ′w answers to watermark
extraction (0 6 mK(kˆw, kˆ′w)  |K|). On the other hand,
other unmarked models might also partly match key labels,
and thus have a positive non-maximum distance too. As an
extreme example, even a strawman model that answers a la-
bel uniformly at random produces |K|/|C| matches in ex-
pectation, when classifying over |C| classes. Consequently,
two questions are central to the frontier stitching approach:
How large is the deviation one should tolerate from the orig-
inal watermark in order to state about successful zero-bit
watermark? And, dependently, how large should the key be,
so that the tolerance is increased?
We propose to rely on a probabilistic approach by esti-
mating the probability of an unmarked model kr to produce
correct answers to requests from inputs in the key. While
providing an analysis that would both be precise and cover
all model behaviors is unrealistic, we rely on a null-model
assuming that inputs in the key are so close to the fron-
tier that, at this “resolution”, the frontier only delimits two
classes (the other classes being too far from the considered
key inputs), and that the probability of each of the two classes
is 1/2 each. This is all the more plausible since we leverage
adversaries especially designed to cause misclassification.
More formally, let k∅ be the null-model: ∀x ∈ K, P[k∅(x) =
kˆw(x)] = 1/2. Having such a null-model allows apply-
ing a p-value approach to the decision criteria. Indeed, let
Z = mK(kˆw, kr) be the random variable representing the
number of mismatching labels for key inputs K. Assum-
ing that the remote model is the null-model, the probabil-
ity of having exactly z errors in the key is P[Z = z|kr =
k∅] = 2−|K|
(|K|
z
)
, that is Z follows the binomial distribu-
tion B(|K|, 12 ). Let θ be the maximum number of errors tol-
erated on kr’s answers to decide whether or not the water-
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Algorithm 1 Zero-bit watermarking a model
Require: Labelled sample set (X,Y ); Trained model kˆ; Key length ` = |K|; Step size ε for adversary generation;
Ensure: kˆw is watermarked with keyK {AssumesX is large enough and ε is balanced to generate true & false adversaries}
{Key construction}
1: adv candidates← GEN ADVERSARIES(kˆ,(X,Y ),ε)
2: while |keytrue| < `/2 or |keyfalse| < `/2 do
3: pick random adversary candidate c ∈ adv candidates, associated to x ∈ X with label yx
4: if kˆ(x) = yx and kˆ(c) 6= yx and |keytrue| < `/2 then {c is a true adversary}
5: keytrue ← keytrue ∪ {(c, yx)}
6: else if kˆ(c) = kˆ(x) = yx and |keyfalse| < `/2 then {c is a false adversary}
7: keyfalse ← keyfalse ∪ {(c, yx)}
8: end if
9: end while
10: (K,Klabels)← keytrue ∪ keyfalse
{Force embedding of key adversaries in their original class}
11: kˆw ← TRAIN(kˆ, K , Klabels)
12: return kˆw, K, Klabels
Algorithm 2 Zero-bit watermark extraction from a remote model
Require: K and Klabels, the key and labels used to watermark the neural network
1: mK ← 0
2: for each c ∈ K do
3: if QUERY REMOTE(c) 6= Klabels(c) then
4: mK ← mK + 1 {remote model answer differs from recorded answer}
5: end if
6: end for
{Having θ such that 2−|K|∑θz=0 (|K|z ) < 0.05 (null-model)}
7: return mK < θ{True⇔ successful extraction}
mark extraction is successful. To safely (p-value < 0.05)
reject the hypothesis that kr is a model behaving like our
null-model, we need P[Z ≤ θ|kr = k∅] < 0.05. That is
2−|K|
∑θ
z=0
(|K|
z
)
< 0.05. In particular, for key sizes of
|K| = 100 and |K| = 20 a p-value of 0.05, the maximum
number of tolerated errors are θ = 42 and 6, respectively.
We thus consider the zero-bit watermark extraction from the
remote model successful if the number of errors is below
that threshold θ, as presented in Algorithm 2. Next Section
includes an experimental study of false positives related to
this probabilistic approach.
4 Experiments
We now conduct experiments to evaluate the proposed ap-
proach in the light of the requirements stated in Section 2.
In particular, we evaluate the fidelity, the effectiveness and
the robustness of our algorithm.
We perform our experiments on the MNIST dataset [18],
using the Keras backend [7] to the TensorFlow platform2
2 Code will be open-sourced on GitHub, upon article acceptance.
[1]. As neural network architectures, we use three off-the-
shelf implementations, available publicly on the Keras web-
site, namely mnist mlp (0.984% accuracy at 10 epochs,
we denote as MLP), mnist cnn (0.993% at 10, denoted
as CNN) and mnist irnn (0.9918% at 900, denoted as
IRNN). Their characteristics are as follows. The MLP is
composed of two fully connected hidden layers of 512 neu-
rons each, for a total of 669, 706 parameters to train. The
CNN is composed by two convolutional layers (of size 32
and 64), with kernel sizes of 3× 3, followed by a fully con-
nected layer of 128 neurons (for a total of 710, 218 parame-
ters). Finally, the IRNN refer to settings by Le et al. [15] and
uses a fully connected recurrent layer (for a total of 199, 434
parameters). All three architectures use a softmax layer as
output.
All experiments are run on networks trained with the
standard parametrization setup: MNIST training set of 60, 000
images, test set of size 10, 000, SGD with mini-batches of
size 128 and a learning rate of 0.001.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 3 An example of a key K of size four (generated with the “fast
gradient sign method” and ε = 0.1), for the CNN classifier and the
MNIST task: Key inputs (a) and (b) are true adversaries (2 and 1 dig-
its, classified as 9 and 8 respectively), while (c) and (d) are false adver-
saries (9 and 8 digits that are correctly classified but knowingly close
to a decision frontier).
4.1 Generating adversaries for the watermark key.
We use the Cleverhans Python library by [24] to generate
the adversaries (function GEN ADVERSARIES() in Al-
gorithm 1). It implements the “fast gradient sign method”
by [11], we recall here for completeness. With θ the param-
eters of the attacked model, J(θ, x, y) the cost function used
to train the model and 5 the gradient of that cost function
with respect to input x, the adversarial image x∗ is obtained
from the input image x by applying the following perturba-
tion:
x∗ = x+ ε . sign(5xJ(θ, x, y)).
ε thus controls the intensity of the adversarial perturbation;
we use a default setting of ε = 0.25.
Alternative methods, such as the “Jacobian-based saliency
map” ([26]), or other attacks for generating adversaries may
also be used (please refer to [38] for a list of existing ap-
proaches). Adversaries are crafted from some test set im-
ages that are then removed from the test set to avoid biased
results.
As explained in Section 3, our key set K is composed
by 50% of true adversaries, and by 50% of false adversaries
(adversarial perturbations that are not causing misclassifica-
tion). In the fast gradient sign method, the value of ε con-
trols the intensity of the perturbations that are applied to
the attacked images. With a large value, most of the adver-
saries are true adversaries and, conversely, a small ε pro-
duces mostly false adversaries. As a consequence, εmust be
chosen so that Algorithm 1 as enough inputs (`/2) of each
kind, in order to build the key. Altogether, the adversaries
in the key are close to the decision frontiers, so that they
“clamp” these boundaries. An example of a key is displayed
in Fig. 3.
4.2 Impact of watermarking (fidelity requirement).
This experiment considers the impact on fidelity of the wa-
termark embedding, of sizes |K| = 20 and |K| = 100, in
the three networks. We generated multiple keys for this ex-
periment and the following ones (see Algorithm 1), and kept
those which required fewer that 100 epochs for embedding
in the models (resp. 1000 for IRNN), using a fine tuning rate
of 110 th of the original training rate. The following results are
averaged over 30 independent markings per network.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) in Fig. 4
shows the accuracy for the 3 networks after embedding keys
of the two sizes. IRNN exhibits nearly no degradation, while
embedding in the MLP causes on average 0.4% and 0.8%
loss for respectively key sizes 20 and 100.
We remarked no significant degradation difference when
marking (|K| = 20, 10 independent runs) a model with
adversaries generated under `1, `2 and `∞ norms. For in-
stance, we marked the CNN model with ε = 150 (`1, fool-
ing 88.54% of MNIST test set), ε = 7 (`2, fooling 87.56%)
and ε = 0.25 (`∞, fooling 89.08%); This has resulted in ac-
curacy drops of respectively 0.23%, 0.22% and 0.14%. We
use `∞ in the sequel.
4.3 False positives in remote watermark extraction
(effectiveness requirement).
We now experiment the effectiveness of the watermark ex-
traction (Algorithm 2). When querying the remote model re-
turns True, it is important to get a low false positive rate. To
measure this, we ran on non watermarked and retrained net-
works of each type the extraction Algorithm 2, with keys
used to watermark the three original networks. Ideally, the
output should always be negative. We use |K| = 100, and
various values of ε ∈ {0.025, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5}. We observe on
Fig. 6 that the false positives are occurring for lower values
0.025 and 0.1 on some scenarios. False positives disappear
for ε = 0.5.
This last experiment indicates that the model owner has
to select a high ε value, depending on her dataset, as the
generated adversaries are powerful enough to prevent accu-
rate classification by the remote inspected model. We could
not assess a significant trend for a higher degradation of the
marked model when using a higher ε as depicted in Fig. 5,
where the CNN model is marked with keys of |K| = 20
and for ε ∈ {0.025, 0.1, 0.5} (10 runs per ε value). The 0.25
value is to be observed on Fig. 4. We note that this relates
to adversarial training, a form of specialized data augmen-
tation that can be used as generic regularization [11] or to
improve model resilience to adversarial attacks [24]. Models
are thus trained with adversarial examples, which is in rela-
tion to our watermarking technique that incorporates adver-
sarial examples in a fine-tuning step, without ruining model
accuracy.
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Fig. 4 Distribution of the degradation caused by watermarking models (resulting accuracy), with multiple keys of size 20 and 100 (ε = 0.25).
Black vertical dot-dash lines indicate pre-watermarking accuracies.
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Fig. 5 Distribution of the degradation caused by watermarking the
CNN model (resulting accuracy), with multiple keys of size 20, and
for various ε ∈ {0.025, 0.1, 0.5} in the `∞ norm. The black vertical
dot-dash line indicates the pre-watermarking accuracy.
4.4 Attacking the watermarks of a leaked model
(robustness requirement).
We now address the robustness of the stitching algorithm.
Two types of attacks are presented: Model compression (via
both pruning and singular value decomposition) and over-
writing via fine-tuning.
We consider plausible attacks over the leaked model,
i.e., attacks that do not degrade the model beyond a cer-
tain accuracy, which we set to 0.95 in the sequel3 (the three
networks in our experiments have accuracy above 0.984).
In our set-up, re-using a leaked model that has been sig-
nificantly degraded in the hope to remove a possible water-
mark does not make sense; the attacker would rather use a
less precise, yet legitimate model.
We remark that due to the nature of our watermarking
method, an attacker (who does not possess the watermark
key) will not know whether or not her attacks removed the
watermark from the leaked model.
Compression attack via pruning As done by [35], we
study the effect of compression through parameter pruning,
where 25% to 85% of model weights with lowest absolute
values are set to zero. Results are presented on Tab. 1. Among
all plausible attacks, none but one (50% pruning of IRNN
parameters) prevents successful and 100% accurate extrac-
tion of the watermarks. We note that the MLP is prone to
important degradation of accuracy when pruned, while at
the same time the average number of erased key elements
from the model is way below the decision threshold of 42.
Regarding the CNN, even 85% of pruned parameters are not
enough to reach that same threshold.
Compression attack via Singular Value Decomposition
We experimented with a second compression attack: we
used a compression library available on GitHub (keras
3 This about 3.5% accuracy drop is also the one tolerated by a recent
work on trojaning neural networks [20].
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Fig. 6 Distribution of (normalized) Hamming distance when extracting the watermark (generated on networks kˆw listed on right axis) from remote
unmarked models kr (w. names on the top), for |K| = 100 and four values of ε. Vertical solid bars indicate the decision threshold corresponding
to p < .05 criteria. False positives (i.e., unmarked model at distance less than the threshold) happen when the CDF is on the left of the bar.
Algorithm 1’s value ε = 0.5 (purple solid curve) prevents the issue of false positives in all cases.
Pruning rate K elts removed Stdev Extraction rate Acc. after
CNN 0.25 0.053/100 0.229 1.000 0.983
- 0.50 0.263/100 0.562 1.000 0.984
- 0.75 3.579/100 2.479 1.000 0.983
- 0.85 34.000/100 9.298 0.789 0.936
IRNN 0.25 14.038/100 3.873 1.000 0.991
- 0.50 59.920/100 6.782 0.000 0.987
- 0.75 84.400/100 4.093 0.000 0.148
MLP 0.25 0.360/100 0.700 1.000 0.951
- 0.50 0.704/100 0.724 1.000 0.947
- 0.75 9.615/100 4.392 1.000 0.915
- 0.80 24.438/100 5.501 1.000 0.877
Table 1 Robustness to compression attack (pruning-based): Watermark extraction success rates (|K| = 100), after a pruning attack on water-
marked models. Different pruning rates are tested to check if watermarks get erased while accuracy remains acceptable. Results in gray rows are
to be ignored (not plausible attacks).
compressor4) which leverages singular value decompo-
sition (SVD) on model weights, to compress them. We tested
it to be compatible with MLP and CNN. Tab. 2 shows that
the key extraction on CNN is not affected by this new attack,
as accuracy drops at 88% for 50% weights compression and
with an average of 20 elements removed (over 42 tolerated).
The extraction from MLP starts to be affected with high
4 https://github.com/DwangoMediaVillage/
keras_compressor
compression of 75% of the weights, with 48 elements re-
moved.
Overwriting attack via adversarial fine-tuning Since
we leverage adversaries in the key to embed the watermark
in the model, a plausible attack is to try overwriting this wa-
termark via adversarial fine-tuning of the leaked model. As
explained in Section 4.3, this action also relates to adversar-
ial training that originally aims to improve model resilience
to adversarial attacks [24]. In this experiment, we turn 1, 000
images from the MNIST test set into adversaries and use
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Pruning rate K elts removed Stdev Extraction rate Acc. after
CNN 0.25 1.867/100 1.457 1.000 0.987
- 0.50 20.143/100 4.721 1.000 0.885
- 0.75 69.643/100 3.296 0.000 0.426
- 0.90 83.714/100 3.989 0.000 0.255
MLP 0.25 0.385/100 0.898 1.000 0.973
- 0.50 5.760/100 2.697 1.000 0.966
- 0.75 48.423/100 5.742 0.077 0.953
- 0.90 83.760/100 6.346 0.000 0.157
Table 2 Robustness to compression from library keras compressor (SVD-based), compatible with CNN and MLP.
K elts removed Stdev Extraction rate Acc. after
CNN 17.842 3.594 1.000 0.983
IRNN 37.423 3.931 0.884 0.989
MLP 27.741 5.749 1.000 0.972
Table 3 Robustness to overwriting attacks: Rate of remaining zero-bit
watermarks in the three attacked models, after model fine-tuning with
1, 000 new adversaries.
them to fine-tune the model (the test set being the remain-
ing 9, 000 images). The results of the overwriting attacks
is presented on Tab. 3. An adversarial fine-tuning of size
1, 000 uses 20 times more adversaries than the watermark-
ing key (as |K| = 100, with 50% true adversaries). We see
perfect watermark extractions (no false negatives) for CNN
and MLP, while there are few extraction failures from the
attacked IRNN architecture. This experiment is thus con-
sistent with recent arguments about the general difficulty to
defend against adversaries [34,31].
Conclusion on the attacks of watermarks We highlight that
in all but two tries, the watermark is robust to considered
attacks. In addition, since the attacker cannot know whether
her attack is successful or not (as the key is unknown to her),
each new attack trial is bound to degrade the model even fur-
ther, without removal guarantee. This uncertainty will prob-
ably considerably discourage trials of this kind.
4.5 About the efficiency and security requirements.
The efficiency requirement deals with the computational cost
of querying a suspected remote service with the |K| queries
from the watermarking key. Given typical pricing of cur-
rent online machine learning services (Amazon’s Machine
Learning, for instance, charges $0.10 per 1, 000 classifica-
tion requests as per Jan. 2018), keys in the order of hundreds
of objects as in our experiments incur financial costs that are
negligible, an indication of negligible computational cost as
well. It is to be noted that if the suspected model is running
on an embedded device [13], there is no cost in querying that
model; if we target such an application, keys can then be of
arbitrary length as far as their embedding preserve the accu-
racy of the model to be watermarked. As for the watermark-
ing step (key embedding), it is as complex as fine-tuning
a network using set K. Since the size of K is negligible
compared to the original training set size, the computational
overhead of embedding a key is considered low.
The frontier stitching algorithm deforms slightly and lo-
cally the decision frontiers, based on the labelled samples in
keyK. To ensure security, this key must be kept secret by the
entity that watermarked the model (otherwise, one might de-
vise a simple overwriting procedure that reverts these defor-
mations). Decision frontier deformation through fine-tuning
is a complex process (see work by [3]) which seems very dif-
ficult to revert in the absence of information on the key (this
absence also prevents the use of recent statistical defense
techniques [12]). Could a method detect specific local fron-
tier configurations that are due to the embedded watermark?
The existence of such an algorithm, related to steganalysis in
the domain of multimedia, would indeed be a challenge for
neural network watermarking at large, but seems unlikely.
Our watermarking method relies on algorithms for find-
ing adversarial examples, in order to get inputs nearby de-
cision frontiers. Last few years have witnessed an arms race
between attacks (algorithms for producing adversarial ex-
amples) and defenses to make neural networks more robust
to those attacks; the problem is still open [31] (please re-
fer to [38] for a survey). We argue that our method will re-
main functional regardless of this arms race, as the purpose
of machine learning for classification is to create decision
frontiers for separating target classes; there will always be
means to cross those frontiers, and then to create the inputs
we require in order to create our watermark keys. Authors
in [31] precisely characterize classes of problems for which
adversarial examples cannot be avoided, and that depend on
properties of the data distribution as well as the space di-
mensionality of the dataset.
5 Related Work
Watermarking aims at embedding information into “objects”
that one can manipulate locally. One can consider the inser-
tion of visible watermarks in those objects [4]; we consider
in this work and related work the insertion of invisible wa-
termarks. Watermarking multimedia content especially is a
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rich and active research field, yet showing a two decades old
interest [14]. Neural networks are commonly used to insert
watermarks into multimedia content [6].
After extension to surprising domains such as network
science [40], the extension to watermarking neural networks
as objects themselves is new, following the need to protect
the valuable assets of today’s state of the art machine learn-
ing techniques. Uchida et al. [35,22] thus propose the wa-
termarking of neural networks, by embedding information
in the learned weights. Authors show in the case of convo-
lutional architectures that this embedding does not signifi-
cantly change the distribution of parameters in the model.
Mandatory to the use of this approach is a local copy of
the neural network to inspect, as the extraction of the wa-
termark requires reading the weights of convolution kernels.
This approach is motivated by the voluntary sharing of al-
ready trained models, in case of transfer learning, such as
in [32]’s work for instance.
Neural network watermarking techniques that allow ver-
ification in a remote black-box context were recently pro-
posed. These works relate to our black box system model
(as introduced in the technical report [16]). They indeed
leverage the model’s outputs to carefully chosen inputs to
retrieve the watermark. [39] proposes to train the model to
be protected with a set of specifically crafted inputs in or-
der to trigger the assignment of a specific target label by
the model on those inputs. In other words, their approach is
very similar to trojaning [20]: the triggering of a specific la-
bel facing a crafted input constitutes for the authors a proof
of ownership. Similarly, [2] explicitly exploits the possibil-
ity of neural network trojaning (i.e., , backdooring) for the
same purpose. Finally, [28] directly embeds the watermark
into the layer weights using specific loss functions. How-
ever, contrary to [35] for instance where the weights directly
contain the watermark (which is therefore not accessible in
a black box context), weights in [28] are modified in order to
produce desired activations at runtime given specific inputs.
Surprisingly, the authors also show that watermarking mech-
anisms designed in a black box context can also be used in
a white box context. In a more restricted setup, Guo et al.
propose the adaptation to embedded devices of a black box
capable watermark extraction [13].
Since more and more models and algorithms might only
be accessed through API operations (as being run as a com-
ponent of a remote online service), there is a growing body
of research which is interested in leveraging the restricted
set of operations offered by those APIs to gain knowledge
about the remote system internals. [33] demonstrates that it
is possible to extract an indistinguishable copy of a remotely
executed model from some online machine learning APIs.
Depth of neural models may also be infered using timing
side channel attacks [10]. [25] have shown attacks on remote
models to be feasible, yielding erroneous model outputs.
Authors in [30] target attacks such as evading a CAPTCHA
test, by the reverse engineering of a remote classifier mod-
els. Other attacks focus on the stealing of model hyperpa-
rameters, from APIs [37,23]; [23] aims at infering inner hy-
perparameters (e.g., number of layers, non-linear activation
type) of a remote neural network model by analysing its re-
sponse patterns to certain inputs. Finally, algorithms in [17]
propose to detect the tampering with a deployed model, also
through simple queries to the API; tested attacks are trojan-
ing, compression, fine-tuning and the watermarking method
proposed in this paper. In present work, we propose a wa-
termarking algorithm that is compliant with APIs, since it
solely relies on the basic classification query to the remote
service.
6 Conclusion and perspectives
This article introduces the frontier stitching algorithm, to ex-
tract previously embedded zero-bit watermarks from leaked
models that might be used as part of remote online services.
We demonstrated this technique on image classifiers; sound
[5] and video classifiers [19] were also recently found to be
prone to adversarial attacks. We believe that a demonstra-
tion of existing watermarking techniques in those domains
would be of a great practical interest.
We focused on classification problems, which account
for many if not most ML-based services. Extensions to other
problems (like regressions or semantic segmentation of im-
ages) are a next step for future work, since adversarial ex-
amples also affect those domains.
Regarding the model architecture aspect, we have seen
that the IRNN model is prone to compression attacks (prun-
ing rate of 50% of parameters). This underlines the spe-
cific behavior of architectures facing attacks and marking;
in depth characterization is an interesting future work.
We challenged the robustness of our watermarking scheme
facing compression and overwriting attacks. Other more ad-
vanced types of attacks might be of interest for an attacker
that wants to remove the inserted watermark. In particular,
another attack may be the transfer learning of the water-
marked model to another task. Recent work [8] provides a
first empirical evidence that the adversaries that were inte-
grated in the model through learning (defense) might not
survive the transfer, leading to a potentially successful wa-
termark removal. A full characterization of the resilience of
adversaries facing transfer learning attacks is of great im-
portance for future work.
As another future work, we stress that the watermark in-
formation is currently extracted using the binary answers to
the query made on each object in the key: Whether or not
this object is classified by the remote model as expected
in the key label. Leveraging not only those binary answers,
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but also the actual classification issued by the remote model
(or even the classification scores), may allow one to embed
more information with the same watermark size. Another
possible improvement may come from the use of the recent
concept of universal adversarial perturbations ([21]): they
might be leveraged to build efficient and robust watermark-
ing algorithms. Indeed, this method generates adversaries
that can fool multiple classifiers at once. Relying on such ad-
versaries in an extension of our framework might give rise
to new, improved watermarking algorithms for neural net-
works that are queried in a black box setup.
Finally, we recall that the watermarking technique we
proposed, as well as the ones from the related work [39,2,
13,28], make the assumption that the watermarked model
leaked as a bit-level copy. Recent attacks on stealing models
yet shown the possibility to leak a model by approximating
it [33] through tailored queries. A crucial perspective is thus
to investigate watermark techniques that can resist this alter-
native type of attacks.
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